As Moldova prepares for parliamentary elections on September 28, the stakes go far beyond domestic politics. The country has become a focal point in the geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, with implications for the entire Eastern European region. In late 2021, just months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a series of demands to NATO and the United States. These included a call to halt all military activity in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although framed as a security issue, the underlying objective was clear: to reassert Russian influence in former Soviet territories.
Moldova’s shift toward the West began in November 2020, when pro-European candidate Maia Sandu won the presidency. His party, Action and Solidarity (PAS), won a parliamentary majority in July 2021. In June 2022, Moldova was granted EU candidate status alongside Ukraine, an outcome that alarmed the Kremlin.
In response, Moscow launched a coordinated campaign to reverse Moldova’s European trajectory. Russian authorities replaced their political chief for Moldova, Dmitry Kozak, with Sergei Kiriyenko, known for managing internal elections in Russia. This change signaled a more aggressive strategy, which included potential power scenarios should pro-Russian parties fail to win.
According to some sources, Russia has allocated over €200 million to activities aimed at influencing electoral processes in several countries, including supporting favorable political figures, media propaganda initiatives, and, in some cases, distributing basic necessities to voters. Troll networks and bots targeted Sandu and PAS on platforms such as YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and Facebook, including through the creation of fake content. According to some analyses, part of the funding would have passed through institutions such as Rossotrudnichestvo and Promsvyazbank, the latter linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Russian Orthodox Church—specifically the Moldovan Metropolitan Church of Chisinau—would also have been implicated in these dynamics, with some members of the clergy promoting narratives critical of the West.
According to some assessments and investigative sources, part of the Kremlin’s plan would involve the return to Moldova of up to 15,000 Moldovan citizens working in Russia, with the aim of influencing the outcome of the elections. These citizens would be encouraged to support pro-Russian candidates or participate in post-election rallies, in some cases to declare the victory of their candidates or to raise doubts about the integrity of the vote, depending on the results.
On September 22, Moldovan authorities announced the arrest of 74 people suspected of involvement in paramilitary training in Serbia. According to authorities, these recruits were allegedly preparing for potential unrest and clashes with law enforcement. Ongoing investigations suggest potential links to Russian intelligence agencies and pro-Russian Moldovan political forces, suggesting possible external coordination.
Meanwhile, groups aligned with pro-Russian positions have registered in significant numbers as election observers. According to some sources, foreign politicians from far-right and far-left parties were also involved, with the aim of monitoring and documenting alleged irregularities in the electoral process. These actions could be part of a broader effort to challenge the legitimacy of the vote should the pro-Russian forces be defeated. Moldova is at a crossroads. If Russia’s plans succeed, the country could become an anti-Western stronghold in Eastern Europe. But if Moldova maintains its European course, it will deal a severe blow to the Kremlin’s regional ambitions and serve as a bulwark against neo-imperial expansion.
