The shadow fleet transporting Russian oil has experiencedsignificant growth, representing around 17% of the global oiltanker fleet by the end of 2024. The trajectory of thisphenomenon remains unpredictable, driven by its rapidexpansion and the volatility of the geopolitical and economiclandscape.
This growing situation is a cause for concern among legitimatemaritime carriers, as the number of vessels in the shadow tankerfleet — mainly transporting oil and oil products from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia — is steadily increasing in global waters. These vessels are used to bypass Western sanctions, facilitatedby shell companies and dangerous, covert oil transshipmentoperations. Almost 70% of Russian oil exports are nowtransported by these shadow tankers, and this number hasincreased significantly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.
More than 1,000 shadow vessels are operated in the interests ofRussia. This fleet mainly consists of obsolete tankers in poorworking conditions, most of them not having proper insuranceprovided by leading global companies. They are mainly owned byoffshore companies with opaque ownership rights. Therefore, incase of an accident, it remains unclear who will be bearing theresponsibility.
Security is compromised due to the poorly regulated activities ofthe shadow fleet. It is common practice for shadow tankers todisable their transponders (ship positioning systems), a violationof International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations thatendangers other vessels. The lack of vessel tracking informationjeopardizes the integrity of the global maritime security system.
Moreover, recent incidents in the Baltic Sea indicate that theRussian shadow fleet is not only used to transport oil but is alsoinvolved in damaging European energy and communicationsinfrastructure. The most recent example is the interception anddetention of the tanker Eagle S by Finnish Special Forces. Thisincident clearly indicates that Russia and its partners are aimingto use the shadow fleet for sabotage.
On December 6, 2023, the International Maritime Organization(IMO) adopted an important resolution aimed at addressing theproblems associated with the shadow fleet. The document was a response to concerns about illegal shipping, which is associatedwith bypassing sanctions and carrying out dangerous operations. It calls on IMO member states to forbid registering fraudulentships, and to strengthen inspections of tankers in ports. However, this does not work in practice.
Leading marine operators and shipping management companiespredict that the IMO’s lack of control over the situation and theuncontrolled growth of vessels in shadow fleets will inevitablylead to serious oil spill accidents, which will have catastrophicconsequences for the environment. In addition to environmentaldamage, certified and legally operating companies will also sufferdue to the closure of contaminated areas for shipping.
In addition to the IMO problems, it is worth noting the lack ofattention paid to this issue by EU member states, Norway andIceland. This benefits dishonest businessmen, and allowsauthoritarian regimes in Iran, Venezuela and Russia to bypassinternational sanctions and make big profits.
The international sanctions imposed on individual vessels of theshadow fleet and regulatory measures have a limitedeffectiveness. It is vital to strengthen sanctions against states andentities violating international law, and to counteract fraudulentschemes — international efforts must be collective, consistentand persistent.
Moreover, The EU and UK must tighten the rules on the use ofobsolete tankers to prevent their use in the shadow fleet. Additionally, the ban on suspicious vessels entering ports mustbe effectively enforced.
Experts in maritime law and sanctions have long highlightedDenmark’s ability to fully control ship passage through the straitsbetween the North and Baltic Seas. Similarly, the British andFrench maritime authorities could have control over the EnglishChannel. Maritime security agencies and specialized bodies ofEuropean maritime States have sufficient powers to carry outinspections of suspicious vessels, their detention and arrest.
Additionally, modern technologies allow qualified monitoring ofthe marine area using specialized UAVs and satellite surveillanceto identify the activities of the shadow fleet, and to record illegalship-to-ship transfers (STS). It is very important that OperationNordic Warden, launched by Great Britain, becomes effective andserves as an example for other European maritime states tofollow.
It would be entirely reasonable for the IMO to implementadditional shipping security measures to ensure that the hiddenowners, operators, and crews of vessels under the flags of«convenient” countries are fully aware that violations will not gounnoticed or unpunished. The organization could be effective instrengthening regulations for the inspection of ships carrying outship-to-ship (STS) transshipments, especially if this occursoutside exclusive economic zones, without observing theestablished reporting procedures.
The growing size and sophistication of shadow fleet activity poseongoing challenges that require coordinated international efforts. The IMO cannot achieve this breakthrough on its own. Unfortunately, it lacks the ability to directly enforce regulationsthat already do not cover the full range of fraudulent methodsused by shadow fleets.
In this context, it is highly expected that the participants of the«Shadow Fleet: A Call to Action» initiative (18 July 2024) will trulyadhere to the principles and commitments they have signed. It iscrucial that the declaration does not suffer the same fate as theBudapest Memorandum and other international agreements.
